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INTRODUCTION

It is a privilege and honor for me to make the concluding
address of this excellent symposium on world agricultural trade.
Ed Harshbarger and his colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City are certainly to be complimented for assembling such
a distinguished group of participants, as well as a most impressive
audience.

Hopefully, the discussions of the past two days will

stimulate and enhance world agricultural trade over the next two
decades or more.
Since the topic of this morning's program relates to the
linkage of world food supply and demand, I will concentrate
primarily on that topic.

However, my talk will also deliberately

spillover into the subject matter of yesterday's discussions.
My intent will be to outline the basic issues of this symposium
in a format that could be used for follow-up policy discussions
in this or any other country.
Though food policy is an area of study which contains few
absolutes, it has at least one parameter with which most of us
can agree - that worldwide supply and demand will be in equilibrium
on relatively few occasions during the rest of this century.

Five

years ago we had a situation where demand outran supply, with
rr~ny

agricultural prices reaching their hignest levels ever.

In

contrast, at the end of last year's harvest we found the reverse
situation to be extant.

Worldwide supply had outrun demand, with
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All of us hope these extremes can be avoided in the future,
and many nations are taking steps individually, and perhaps
collectively, to reduce the probability of widely fluctuating
prices.

Nevertheless, some imbalance is bound to

occur, if for no other reason than that we still cannot control
the weather.

With the Soviet Union now being a major element in

the world market situation, and with that nation being subject to
extremes of both frost and drought, economic uncertainty will
likely be the rule rather than the exception in the near term, if
not the long term.

If so, how then can we adjust to the supply-

demand imbalances that will inevitably occur?
SUPPLY OUTRUNS DEMAND
Let us deal first with the present situation, where supply
has outrun effective demand.

Obviously, there are a number of

short-run steps that can be taken in such a situation, and also a
number of longer term actions should the situation prove to be
chronic (unlikely as that may be), rather than just temporary.

I

would like first to enumerate the short-run possibilities, since
those are the policy issues which face both exporting and importing
nations today.
Short Run Actions
1.

Move The Product Into Consumption, Both Human And

Livestock
Nations should permit and encourage the responsiveness of
their livestock and poultry industries- to situations such as the
one which presently prevails.

Regrettably, some nations isolate

these industries from worldwide supply conditions in the grain
and oil seeds sector, thereby minimizing, and sometimes even

2

precluding, a desirable expansion in those industries.

Sf
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course, deprives their consumer sector of an opportunity to
expand consumption of these excellent protein foods, and it
forces an inordinate level of adjustment in the livestock and
poultry economies of "price responsive" nations.
Whether or not an international trading nation has a market
economy, it ought to pursue policies which will permit its livestock
and poultry sectors to buffer the price and income blows that
will otherwise be felt in their own grain and oilseeds industries,
and in the grain, oilseeds, livestock and poultry industries of
market economy nations with relatively open trading policies.
This was a major element of the price instability which occurred
in 1973 and 1974, and we ought to try to improve that situation
in the future.
Some adjustment in human consumption should occur as well.
At a time of surplus production in the world, governments ought
to reappraise policies which discourage food consumption, and
which keep the percentage of per capita incomes expended for food
at an inordinately high level.

In other words, we ought to

permit the price system to function in the consumer sector too,
thereby increasing consumption levels as farm prices decline.
2.

Reduce Trade Barriers

In times of surplus, nations should adjust trade barriers
which will have an immediate

conslli~ption

response.

Quota programs

constitute perhaps the best example, since the import response
to a quota increase is usually immediate.

Many countries have

quota programs which have little, if any
- , economic justification,
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and often a political justification that is long since obsolete.
In those cases, they could contribute to the welfare of their own
consumers, and substantially benefit exporting nations, by loosening
their trade constraints permitting some of the agricultural surplus
to flow in.
3.

Establish or Expand Storage Programs

This can be done on either a national or international
basis, or both, where non-perishable products are concerned.
There are a good many nations in the world today which need to
protect themselves further against food security risks.

The

surest way to do this is through an expansion in their own storage
capacity.

In terms of product cost, the ideal time to do this,

of course, is when worldwide food surpluses exist.

The product

can be purchased at an attractive price, and (if necessary) simply
stored in exporting nations until construction of new storage
facilities in the buying country have been completed.
This is also an ideal time to create and stock an international
food reserve, if there be the political will among major exporting
and importing nations to take such action.

A well-coordinated

international program certainly has advantages over ad hoc,
unilateral efforts to establish storage programs in either exporting
or importing nations.
4.

Expand Aid Programs

Humanitarian considerations should be the primary motivation
for taking these actions, either on a grant or long-term loan
basis.

The U.S. program which fills this need is, of course,

P.L. 480, our "Food for Peace" effort.

Other countries have

similar programs, and all may appropriately be expanded during
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times such as this, providing the expansion does not place undue
strains on the distribution network and the agricultural production
sector of recipient nations.

There must clearly be a balancing

of interests in this respect, lest the programs be counterproductive
in the longrun, though they be helpful in the shortrun.

With

that caveat, however, it should be possible to find room for
reasonable expansion of such programs in a year like 1977 or
1978.

Not only can this improve the nutritional levels of many

hungry people, but it can also have longrun market development benefits.
Surplus situations have often led to strident, unfair, and
even irrational trade responses among competitive nations.

This

is particularly true among exporters, but it "takes two to tango"
so importers are not entirely free from criticism.

Perhaps the

most widely used "throat cutting" mechanism in international trade
is that of the export subsidy.

When brought into action with all

its fury, the export subsidy simply becomes a battle of federal
treasuries.

Such practices are extremely costly to the subsidizing

exporters, many of whom are often developing countries which
cannot afford it, and they provide an enormous income transfer to
beneficiary importing nations.

Though importers may temporarily

gloat over such a result, the long term results may well prove to
be detrimental, rather than beneficial.

It would be well to

avoid such non-competitive responses to a surplus situation, and
at least discuss the policy options in a reasonably tranquil,
multilateral atmosphere before embarking upon such actions.

This

is the advantage of an international agreement, with guidelines
or triggers which will lead to such consultations.
5

5.

Provide Farmers With Income Protection, Rather Than Price

Protection
If the price system is permitted to function, a surplus
will move into consumption, farmers will adjust their production
plans to the price signals that are received, and the unprofitable
price levels will probably prove to be- temporary.

At the same

time, i t certainly is desirable to provide farmers with a reasonable
level of income protection.

This can be done through target

prices, as is the case here in the U.S., or through similar
mechanisms that will not impede the supply adjustments that
should take place. To achieve this objective a deficiency payment
policy (such as that followed by the U.S. and a number of other
countries) would seem to be infinitely preferable to high price
support programs.
6.

Permit Currency Exchange Rates to Adjust as Market Conditions

Dictate
The world has not yet fully adjusted to its new monetary era
involving floating exchange rates.

As a consequence, some nations

are still engaging in "dirty float" operations, which impede the
adjustment in trade flows that would otherwise occur.

This

affects both industrial and agricultural trade, and can have a
most detrimental income effect on exporting countries.

An aggressive

market development program by an exporter - a perfectly proper
response to a surplus situation - will fail-ignominiously if such

.

an effort is offset by exchange rate manipulations within importing
nations.
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7.

Reduce Production, Through a "Set Aside" or

Comparable Program
Programs to curb production will not be met with enthusiasm
by importing nations, even in times of surplus.

They will inevitably

provoke criticism because of omnipresent malnutrition conditions
in the world, which are only nominally affected by the availability
of agricultural surpluses.

This is a sensitive and delicate policy

issue, with income distribution and other complex parameters
beyond the scope of today's discussion.
Notwithstanding the inevitable criticism, a set aside may
well be the most feasible policy option to correct major supplydemand imbalances in the short-run.

With an inelastic supply and

demand situation for most agricultural products, a set aside can
have an immediate price response of substantial benefit to producers.
Long Run Actions
1.

Reduce Or Eliminate Both Tariff And Non-Tariff

Trade Barriers
This is a multilateral exercise which has been traditionally
conducted in "rounds" of negotiations; these rounds have been
held every few years since the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (the GATT) was executed just after World War II.

In the

future, one must hope that worldwide trade problems will be
confronted on a continuing basis, rather than in the stutter-step
style that has prevailed in the past.

If so, this should permit

us to approach more closely the comparative advantage principle
of international trade, which would be helpful not only in surplus
supply situations, but in times of shortage as well.
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2.

Assist And Stimulate The Economic Development

Efforts Of The Third World
The growth area for international -trade in agricultural
products lies in nations which will have both the population
and the purchasing power to dramatically expand food consumption.
To a very great degree, the nations fulfilling these criteria
between now and the year 2000 will come primarily from the
Third World.

These are countries, particularly in the Far East

and Latin America, which have the natural resources, the human
resources, or both to advance to the IIdeveloped" group, or
very near thereto.

To the degree that we and other developed

nations can help such countries to progress economically, we
too will benefit therefrom.

There should be a particularly

strong motivation for agricultural exporting nations to
assist in such endeavors, -because of the market potential that is
involved, along with the laudable impact this will have on
worldwide income distribution.
There will be demand growth in the developed countries too,
of course, and this should certainly not be ignored.

But

population growth has slowed in those parts of the world, and
is not likely to alter substantially in the future.

Therefore,

the upgrading of diets in most countries will supply only limited
growth potential in total food consumption. 'That desirable
combination of population growth and purchasing power will
likely emerge elsewhere in the world.
3.

Eliminate Exchange Rate Policies Which Impede Trade

Importing nations sometimes maintain undervalued currencies
in order to stimulate their own exports.
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This obviously is

inflationary, and it just as obviously reduces import volumes.
Nevertheless, these nations are willing to pay that price in order to
sustain and improve their own export potential.

In the long

run, however, this will prove to pe a shortsighted policy, and
market forces will ultimately prevail.

In a period of excess

supplies, it would be in the long run-best interest of everyone
to permit the currency market to operate without impediments.
4.

Follow Circumspect International Lending Practices

There have been some incidents in recent years when
international lending agencies have stimulated the production
of agricultural products where surpluses had already driven
prices to unprofitable levels.
proper nonetheless.

It may be that the loans were

It is conceivable that competitive forces

would call for the phasing out of production of that particular
commodity in developed countries, and phasing in of production
in one or more Third World countries.

If so, the loan program

cannot legitimately be criticized.
If, on the other hand, the Third World investment would be
non-competitive, even in the long run, then the loan was a mistake.
It is certainly proper to ask that international lending organizations examine their commodity loan practices with considerable
care, and avoid adding to already existing surpluses wherever
possible.
5.

Achieve Additional Stability Through The Use Of

Long Term Contracts Or Futures Markets
An individual nation, whether it be an importer or exporter,

may take a number of unilateral steps to achieve greater price
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stability.

Some nations already do this through farm policies

which isolate themselves from market conditions elsewhere in
the world.

I am by no means a proponent of such policies, for

they simply force the burden of adjustment onto the shoulders
of other nations.

Furthermore, these policies are too often

inflexible and thereby permanently distortive.
In my opinion, there are at least two ways of achieving
greater price and income stability in a particular nation,
without forcing major adjustments on one's fellow trading
partners.

One way is through the use of long term contracts,

particularly if (as would usually be the case) the contracts do
not have fixed price provisions.

Such contracts offer an exporting

nation a certain degree of market security, while offering the
importing partner a certain degree of supply security.

Both

benefit from this, aside from whether or not price protection is
added to volume protection.
A second method is through the use of futures markets.

There

are active futures markets available today in most of the major
agricultural commodities, and many nations, agencies, and firms
could avail themselves of the hedging opportunities that those
markets provide.
6.

Support Research And Extension Programs To Reduce

Costs And Increase Efficiency In The Agricultural Production
And Marketing Processes Of All Nations
In a long run surplus situation, there may be little that
can be done to improve farm prices.

But one may well be able

to reduce production and marketing costs.
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If so, income levels

will improve throughout the entire agribusiness sector, notwithstanding the adverse price situation.

This is a time for the

development of "cost reducing" technology, rather than "output
_increasing" technology.

The latter may well reduce the income

levels in the agricultural sector, because of price inelasticity
of demand.

The former, on the other hand should boost incomes,

thereby proving to be a most welcome investment under the
circumstances.
Now let us look at what many people believe to be the
more likely scenario in future years - the specter of food
shortages. There will be some duplication of measures for,
interestingly, some apply both in times of shortage and of surplus.
DEMAND OUTRUNS SUPPLY
Short Run Actions
1.

Avoid "Beggar thy Neighbor" Policies

Perhaps the greatest

contribution that can be made toward the resolution of short-run
food crises is an act of omission.

That is, food surplus nations,

such as the United States, should avoid export restraints and
permit market forces to function.
not a time in which to be selfish.

A time of food shortage is
It may, in fact, be a time

which calls for actions beyond those afforded by the market.
If only price is used to allocate food under such circumstances,
the rich will eat and the poor will starve._ Therefore, it is
incumbent upon rich countries, and rich people within poor
countries, to share on a humanitarian basis with those in need.
We have not always been this idealistic, in the United States
or anywhere else.
As I noted earlier, one of our major problems in "burden
sharing" in the food sector is
11
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market forces are impeded in

many portions of the world.

This means that in a time of short-

age, as well as in a time of surplus, the livestock and poultry
industries of some countries must bear an. undue share of the
adjustment.

Note, for example, the trauma experienced by the U.S.

livestock industry in the food shortage period of 1973 and beyond.
Permitting market forces to function will correct this inequity.
2.

Immediately Terminate Production Disincentives

Many nations still maintain systems of production disincentives,
though they are usually not denominated as such.

Involved are

national "cheap food" policies, designed-to garner the political
and economic approval of the consumer sector.

These policies are

often shortsighted at best, and certainly indefensible in a
period of food shortages.

Under such circumstances, they ought

to be altered or eliminated immediately.
3.

Provide Production Incentives Where Necessary

In countries where market forces are permitted to work,
such incentives may not be necessary.

Attractive prices are

likely to stimulate expanded usage of fertilizers, chemicals,
and other inputs that will increase yields.

In non-market

economy countries, however, or in countries where the market
system is not permitted to function to its fullest, governmental
incentives may be essential.

In such situations, nations

should have stand-by policies to apply when 'short term food
shortages have developed.
4.

Make Food Reserves Available

Whether or not a formalized international food reserve
is in existence, nations should make food reserves available
to their own people, and hopefully to the world market as well.

12

At a time of shortage, the "triggers" of most food reserve
programs should release automatically.

In some cases, price

movements will achieve such a result; in other cases,
governmental action may be necessary.

Reserves should move in

to distribution, until such time as minimum carry-over levels are
reached nationally and internationally.
5.

Reduce Waste

We still waste tremendous quantities of food in the marketing
process, particularly where perishables are involved.

Though

this is a never ending challenge, there are short run steps that
countries and firms can take to reduce waste in a time of crisis.
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6.

Evaluate Exchange Rate Policies

Even in an era of

floating exchange- rates, one often discovers individual exchange
rate policies which impede trade.

These policies, whether they

be deliberate or simply due to bureaucratic inertia, can easily
lead to a beggar thy neighbor
short.

s~tuation

when food supplies are

This is not a time for "dirty float."

Therefore, nations

ought to adjust such policies so that they facilitate trade rather
than impede it.
7.

Evaluate Fiscal And Monetary Policies

The shortage of

food supplies will have an inflationary impact on national economies,
and this impact will be dramatic.

Because food is purchased on a

daily or weekly basis, and since most housewives make those purchases in cash, food price increases are immediately noticed and
immediately felt.

The reverberations from this will quickly pene-

trate the entire economy.

This is a phenomenon that was experienced

by all of us in 1973 and 1974.

At such a time, it would be well for

nations to examine their total fiscal and monetary policies to determine whether they are further accelerating inflation.

Should those

policies be over-heating a given economy, they should be adjusted
to minimize the adverse impact in the consumer sector.
Long Run Actions
Finally, perhaps the most penetrating concern of all - and
certainly the most worrisome to everyone of us - is that of longrun food shortages.

All of us have seen population projections where

normal food needs exceed any reasonable estimate of food suppy
availability a half century or a century in the future.
thusian model seems to be hovering on the horizon.

The Mal-

To date we

have kept it hovering, but no one knows when it might ultimately
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become a reality.

What then can we do to stave it off for a few

more decades, ox perhaps even indefinitely?
1.

Restrain The Growth of Population

This is an obvious answer, oft discussed, so there is no
need in dwelling upon it here.

Population can be restrained in

any given country, even among those in the lesser developed category.

The successful programs are there for anyone to see.

The

real public policy question is whether a given nation is prepared
to embark upon such a sensitive and often politically controversial
program.
is

~

If so, progress can be made; if not, unless that nation

major agricultural producer or has wealth borne of other re-

sources, it will have to take other painful public policy steps
to deal with its long range food supply requirements.

Few nations

can tolerate indefinitely - politically, let alone economically the impact of a 3.5% population growth rate.

Therefore, as a

practical matter, population control programs will become imperative in many of the nations of the world.
2.

Stimulate Production

Another obvious response, with many ways for doing so.

Crop

yields have risen dramatically in the twentieth century, and there
is no reason to believe they will do otherwise in the twenty-first
century.

But we have had significant technological breakthroughs

(hybrid corn, e.g.) which have contributed to the plentiful food
supplies of recent years.

There are some who believe that break-

throughs of a comparable magnitude during the next century are not
likely to occur.
times ahead.

If they are correct, we could have difficult

This means that agricultural research should receive
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a high priority in the U.S. and other major agricultural producing
nations of the world.

It means further that existing technology

should be transmitted to producers in the most effective way possible.

This will require extension programs much more comprehensive

in their geographic and human coverage than has been true in the
past.

Management techniques will need to be improved too, so that

more farmers will begin to exceed the yield averages which prevail
in the world today.
In addition, efficient producers must be rewarded for their
efforts.

In the U.S. we have found the profit incentive to be a

tremendous stimulus to production.

If other countries wish to

substitute differing incentives, that is their privilege.

In the

absence of such incentives, however, the necessary production increases simply will not occur.
Farmers in the U.S. and elsewhere also need a reasonable
level of protection on the downside.

It takes a great deal of

talent and experience to manage and operate the modern farm of
today.

It is a tremendous waste of human resources to have that

talent disappear from the agricultural scene in a sea of financial
woes.

I certainly do not advocate insurance against failure, in

agriculture of any other enterprise.

But we can moderate the

financial impact of unpredictable and perhaps even uninsurable
risks in the agricultural sector of any nation.

This can be done

through the use of target prices, governmental crop insurance programs, etc.

Reasonable protections of this nature can pay big

dividends in maintaining stability in agriculture.
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3.

Assist Lesser Developed Nations With Food Production

Potential
There is still substantial potential for dramatic increases
in food production among a number of the lesser developed nations.
For example, the llanos of South America, a gigantic region, could
be operated much more intensively than it is today.

But there are

myriad problems involved in bringing these and other such lands
anywhere near to full production.

The capital requirements alone

far exceed the discretionary financial resources presently available to these countries.

Therefore, major international lending

endeavors will be essential to their agricultural development.
Not only will massive infusions of capital be required for
production inputs, but the infrastructure (roads, powerlines,
waterwells, etc.) will have to be there too.

Without these, agricul-

tural development projects are doomed to failure.
4.

Foster Economies of Scale and Production and Marketing

Efficiencies
Few nations of the world today even approach the economies of
scale that are possible in modern agriculture.

In many cases, this

reflects deliberate public policies based on social considerations.
One cannot criticize such policies, for nations are entitled to
establish their own priorities.

But the trade-offs involved should

at least be understood.
One critical trade-off is that agricultural production will
assuredly not be as efficient, profitable, and probably not as productive as it would be if agricultural innovations, economies of
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scale and other production and marketing efficiencies were emphasized.
If and when food shortages become a chronic global problem, these
nations may wish to reassess their priorities.

The trade-offs may

become too costly, wherein economic considerations may ultimately
outweigh those in the social sphere.
5.

Reduce Trade Barriers

You will recall that I advocated a reduction in trade barriers
in times of agricultural surpluses.
as well.

I do so in times of shortage

Under the latter condition, one can simply not justify

impediments to the free movement of agricultural goods throughout
the world.

Though trade barriers have been reduced over the past

thirty years, much more progress has been made in industry than in
the agricultural sector.

Agricultural barriers abound, and all

nations need to reassess their own agricultural protectionism in
light of projected world food needs in the coming decades.
Putting it another way, the GATT rules on agricultural trade
need to be strengthened, delineated with greater specificity, and
applied with diligence and decisiveness.

Present GATT rules come

close to institutionalizing the beggar thy neighbor policies of
agricultural trade barriers, rather than reducing or eliminating
them.

In the jargon of international trade, we ought to be able

to do a much better job of "rationalizing" th~ international movement of agricultural commodities.
6.

Resolve The Present Energy Crisis

Neither the U.s. nor any other consuming nation has yet to
fully face up to the energy crisis.

unless we are prepared to do

so, in a variety of ways, that crisis will be with us for many
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years to come.

It may be grammatically imperfect to speak of

a "chronic" energy crisis, but that is precisely what we will
have.
If this condition prevails, it will clearly impinge upon
the world's ability to feed itself.

At the economic margin,

all nations must make a choice between energy and food.

Since

the emergence of the energy crisis, that choice has been forced
in the direction of energy.

For us and the other wealthier nations

of the world the choice is distressing, but tolerable.

But for

many of the poorer nations of the world, it is exceedingly painful,
and could ultimately lead to much higher levels of malnutrition.
The answer must be a concerted and deternined

effort to develop

alternative sources of energy at the earliest possible date.
7.

Expand Storage Capacity

Many importing nations, including the Soviet Union, have
significantly expanded their storage capacity (particularly for
grains) in recent years.

This is a laudable objective, and should

be further pursued in the years ahead.

Notwithstanding my earlier

point about export restraints, and the likelihood that most nations
will seek to avoid such, in a crisis all bets are off.

In other

words, in a disaster situation where an exporting nation must
choose whether to feed its own people, or share its food with the
rest of the world, no government will be able to ignore the basic
needs of its own citizens.

Thus, it behooves all importing nations

to maintain a reasonable level of food stocks at all times.

Deter-

mination of that level is somewhat subjective, or course, for there
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are trade-offs between cost and security.
judgement is that some importing nations
tained stocks at a dangerously low level.

Nevertheless, my own
ha:ve~traditionally

main-

That is a policy they

may wish to reassess in the future.
8.

Use Long-Term Contracts and Futures Markets

Finally, importing nations can avail themselves of innovative purchase techniques that can contribute to their own food
security.

Among those techniques are long-term contractual commit-

ments or the purchase of commodities on futures markets.

Though

these modes of operation cannot provide iron clad assurances of
delivery, they are certainly preferable to placing oneself at the
mercy of

unpredictable supply and demand conditions, and they

may be much less costly than alternative protections such as storage
programs.
Long-term contractual commitments, such as the one involving
the U.s. and the Soviet Union, can bring additional stability to
the food supply-demand relationships of the contracting nations,
though it is possible that such arrangements will create additional
instability elsewhere in the world.

That is, the micro and macro

effects may be dissimilar, but it surely is both desirable and
proper for an individual nation to seek certain protections in its
own long-term supply needs.

Any .adverse macro effects should be

dealt with on a multilateral basis.
Futures markets may well provide an even more responsive and
less confining method of achieving such protection than will longterm contractual arrangements.

Both mechanisms are certainly deserv-

ing of consideration by public and private entities of all the major
food trading nations.
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CONCLUSION

Much more could be said.

This is by no means a composite

of all the actions, long term and short term, that can be
taken by governments, quasi public

agen~ies,

and the private

sector to deal with either food shortages or food surpluses.
But I hope I have

enumerated the major ones.

are without controversy.

Few of them

But food policy is too important to

have them be otherwise.
Let us have the debates, nationally and internationally,
and then move forward with policies that are reasonable, rational,
and responsive.
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